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The Arbitrability of Arbitrability
Fox v. Tanner'
I. INTRODUCTION
If you can read the following only once and understand it, consider yourself
part of a very small minority: "It is the dilemma of the box within a box or, in the
case of arbitration, the authority as to the decision as to the authority to make the
decision." 2 That is "arbitrability" in a nutshell; not a simple concept. Indeed, at
oral argument in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the confusion occurred
to a U.S. Supreme Court Justice:
QUESTION: Mr. Roberts, when you use the term, arbitrability, you
mean the agreement of the parties to, the consent of the parties to have a
dispute arbitrated?
MR. ROBERTS: That's arbitrability, and the question in this case is, did
the Kaplans agree to arbitrate that question, the question of arbitrability?
Did they agree to be bound by the arbitrator's decision on the arbitrator's
own jurisdiction?
QUESTION: Then how would you describe a question of whether a par-
ticular subject is subject to the arbitration agreement, which the parties
concededly agreed to?
MR. ROBERTS: Well, in other words, there is an arbitration contract,
and there's a dispute. Is that-that's also called arbitrability.
QUESTION: Yes, that's what confuses me. It seems to me it's two dis-
tinct things, and people call them the same thing.
MR. ROBERTS: The term is used simultaneously in both instances. This
case is the question of arbitrability of arbitrability.3
The suffix "-ability" seems to merely denote the "ability" of something to
happen. For example, "teachability" is the ability for something to be taught.
This is probably intuitive-in contrast, arbitrability does not just mean the ability
for the matter to be arbitrated-it is a technical, specific, term of art.4 "Arbitrabil-
1. 101 P.3d 939 (Wyo. 2004).
2. Perry v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 744 So. 2d 859, 866 n.5 (Ala. 1999).
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938
(1995)(No. 94-560), 1995 WL 242250 (emphasis added).
4. At least one scholar finds the term so confusing that it ought to be banned. Alan Scott Rau, The
Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 287, 308 (1999).
1
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ity" is the question of whether an arbitrator can decide whether a dispute can be
arbitrated. 5
The answer to the above question about "who decides" is not entirely clear
and what that answer should be is also in dispute. Fox v. Tanner6 is an example of
a state court's attempt to reconcile the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings on these
issues.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In February 1998, Frank and Maureen Tanner signed four separate Cash Ac-
count Agreements for Jeffrey Barber, a stockbroker for The Investment Company
(TIC), for investment purposes. 7 The Agreements contained provisions for arbi-
tration which would cover "all controversies or disputes between [the parties] of
any kind.",8 The arbitration provision listed specific disputes that would invoke
the arbitration provision including "(1) any aspect of this account or any other
account ... ; (2) transactions entered into prior, on, or subsequent to the date of
this agreement; and (3) the construction, performance or alleged breach of this or
any other agreement entered into between [the parties] at any time .... "9
After the Tanners gave their money to Barber, he embezzled it.1° The Wyo-
ming Secretary of State began an investigation of TIC's activities in 1999." Bar-
ber pled guilty to four counts of fraud and admitted that he had unlawfully ob-
tained property from the Tanners.' 2 The Secretary of State concluded in its final
order that TIC had failed to reasonably supervise Barber.' 3 During the Secretary
5. See generally First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
6. 101 P.3d. 939.
7. Id. at 940-41. The forms were only signed by the Tanners on a form with TIC's logo on it. Id.
at 941.
8. Id. at 941.
9. Id. The full arbitration clause reads as follows:
Arbitration is final and binding on the parties. The parties are waiving their right to seek reme-
dies in court, including the right to jury trial....
Arbitration-All controversies or disputes between us of any kind shall be settled by arbitration.
Without limiting the foregoing, this arbitration agreement specifically applies to all controversies
or disputes arising out of or relating to (1) any aspect of this account or any other account in
which I now or in the future have or in the past had an interest; (2) transactions entered into prior,
on, or subsequent to the date of this agreement; and (3) the construction, performance, or alleged
breach of this or any other agreement entered into between us at any time.... The award of the
arbitrators, or the majority of them, shall be final, and judgment upon the award rendered may be
entered in any court, state or federal, having jurisdiction. I consent to the jurisdiction of the state
and federal courts in the City of New York for the purpose of compelling arbitration, staying liti-
gation pending arbitration, and enforcing any award of arbitrators.
Id. (omissions are identical to omissions in the case). The Fox court also noted that there was a notice
directly above the signature blocks in the Agreements alerting the reader to the existence of the arbitra-
tion clause within the Agreement. Id.
10. Id. at 940.
11. Id.
12. Id. It appears from the Court's opinion that Barber pled guilty to fraud, as alleged by the Secre-
tary of State, since Barber entered his plea on June 25, 1999 and the investigation by the Secretary of
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of State's proceeding, TIC offered to settle and admitted that it failed to reasona-
bly supervise Barber but refused to admit or deny liability for Barber's actions.'
4
Two years after the Wyoming Secretary of State investigation began, the Tan-
ners15 filed a complaint against Barber, Dorian Fox (Barber's supervisor) and TIC
in Wyoming District Court.1 6 The complaint alleged fraud, breach of contract and
negligence against defendants. 17
Fox and TIC responded to the complaint by seeking dismissal of the action
based on the arbitration clause contained in the four Cash Account Agreements
signed by the Tanners.18 The Tanners countered the dismissal by arguing that Fox
and TIC had previously denied the existence of any contract with the Tanners 9
and that the contract was revocable because of fraud. 20 Fox and TIC countered
that the dispute was still arbitrable because the Tanners had not raised the claim
that they had been fraudulently induced into the arbitration provision. 21 The Tan-
ners produced evidence from the Wyoming Secretary of State proceeding to prove
that TIC had admitted to its failure to reasonably supervise Barber, and therefore,
the contracts, including the arbitration provisions, were void as a result of fraudu-
lent inducement.22
The District Court concluded that the evidence presented was insufficient to
determine whether the Tanner's claims were arbitrable, so it set a date for a fur-
ther evidentiary hearing. 2 3  Prior to this hearing, the Tanners attempted to use
Barber's guilty plea of fraud as a means to collaterally estop the defendants from
denying liability. 24 Fox and TIC responded by stating that they had never admit-
ted liability for Barber's actions in their communications with the Secretary of
25State. Furthermore, Fox and TIC brought in the depositions of the Tanners to
show they indicated that they had not been fraudulently induced into the con-
tracts.26
The District Court concluded at the close of the evidentiary hearing that the
parties had not clearly agreed to arbitrate their claims. 27 The District Court rea-
14. Id.
15. Patricia Clark O'Heam and Barry Fitzgerald were also plaintiffs, but were not parties to the
appeal in the present case. Id. at 940 n.2.
16. Id. at 940. Barber was not a party to the appeal. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 941.
19. The Court states that in response to the complaint, Fox and TIC had initially "denied they had
any relationship with the Tanners whatsoever." Id. at 940. The Cash Account Agreement forms were
only signed by the Tanners. Id. at 941. This did not become an issue for the Court on appeal-
however, plaintiffs later used the fact that the Agreements were not signed to buttress their argument
that the defendants could not enforce the arbitration agreement under the contract and at the same time
deny the existence of a contract. Id. at 944.






26. Id. at 941-42. The Tanners asserted in response that there was no consideration for the agree-
ments. Id. at 942. While the Tanners' supposed admissions that there was no fraud in the inducement
of the contracts and the assertion that there was no consideration for the contracts would seem to be
fatal to the complaint-where it was alleged that the defendants committed fraud and breach of con-
tract-these arguments were made as an attempt to avoid arbitration. Id. at 941.
27. Id. at 942.
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soned that since Barber had admitted to fraud, imposing arbitration on the Tanners
was inappropriate because, if the contracts were the product of fraud, the Tanners
had not contemplated arbitrating their disputes.28 Therefore, a court, and not an
arbitrator, should decide whether the Tanners were fraudulently induced into the
contracts, including into the arbitration provision. 29 The court collaterally es-
topped defendants Fox and TIC-binding them to the Secretary of State's finding
that Fox and TIC had failed to reasonably supervise Barber.
30
Fox and TIC appealed the District Court's denial of their motion to dismiss.
31
They argued that the District Court erred because its result was in conflict with the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.32
Prima Paint held that when the entire contract is attacked by a general claim of
fraudulent inducement, an arbitrator may decide the claim. 33 However, when the
claim of fraud is directed to the arbitration provision, a court must hear the
claim.34 Since the Tanners' claims amounted to a general attack on the contract
and not specifically the arbitration provision, the dispute should be submitted to
arbitration according to the contracts.
35
The Tanners responded to the appeal by arguing that Prima Paint has been
modified by later U.S. Supreme Court rulings and the 10th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.36 These later cases state that for an agreement to arbitrate to be enforced,
the parties must have manifested "a clear and unmistakable consent to arbitrate,"
including the issue of arbitrability.
37
The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the District Court's denial of the
motion to dismiss. 38 Since there was an issue of fraud raised as to the inducement
of the contract, invoking an arbitration clause of a possibly unenforceable contract
would not make sense unless all of the parties had manifested clear and unmistak-
able consent to arbitrate that issue.39 The court held that there was no evidence
that the Tanners had clearly and unmistakably agreed to submit the validity of the
arbitration agreement to arbitration, so a court was the appropriate forum for the
dispute."0
HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Fox v. Tanner exemplifies an immense
problem in the current state of the law on arbitration-how to interpret First Op-
28. Id.
29. Id. at 940.
30. Id. at 942.
31. Id. at 940.
32. Id. at 943
33. Id.; Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
34. Fox, 101 P.3d at 943.
35. Id.
36. Id. Plaintiffs rely on the following cases: Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79
(2002); Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 950.
39. Id. at 947.
40. Id. at 944.
[Vol. 2
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tions.4 1 Twenty-eight years after establishing the doctrine of separability in Prima
Paint, it is unclear whether the U.S. Supreme Court changed its mind in First
Options.42 In order to answer that question, it is necessary to examine Prima
Paint, First Options and related cases.
Before looking at case law, a general introduction to arbitrability is helpful,
although this is undoubtedly an oversimplification of the U.S. Supreme Court's
position on arbitrability. In deciding an issue on arbitrability, first ask whether the
issue is a substantive or procedural one in order to determine whether the dispute
should be resolved by an arbitrator or by a court.43 If the issue is a substantive
one, the court decides the issue.44 If the issue is a procedural one, the arbitrator
decides the issue. 45 A substantive issue might include fraud, whereas a procedural
issue could include timeliness of the arbitration request.
46
Prima Paint was decided by a split of 6-3 in the U.S. Supreme Court in
1967. 47 Prima Paint Corporation, after it bought Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Corporation's paint business, sued Flood & Conklin in federal court for fraudulent
misrepresentation for claiming the business was solvent-when in fact, it was
filing for bankruptcy.48 From the above discussion, we know that fraud is a sub-
stantive issue and those issues are decided by the court. In its holding, as we will
see, Prima Paint carves out another area under the zone of substantive issues
where arbitration is enforced. The Court affirmed a motion to compel arbitration
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 49 The Court found that a general or
broad claim of fraud should go to arbitration. 50 The Court in Prima Paint rested
its analysis on the statutory language of the FAA, looking predominantly to sec-
tions 3 and 4.51 The Court reasoned that "except where the parties otherwise in-
tend[,] arbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are 'separable' from the con-
tracts in which they are embedded. 52 This is because section 4 of the FAA gives
a federal court no jurisdiction to hear the case unless the "making of the agree-
ment for arbitration or the failure to comply (with the arbitration agreement) is not
41. Id; First Options, 514 U.S. 938.
42. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395; First Options, 514 U.S. 938.
43. LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 534 (1997).
44. Id. A substantive issue goes to the court "unless the parties provide differently in their agree-
ment." Id. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); First
Options, 514 U.S. 938).
45. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 534. (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543, 555-59 (1964)).
46. See ld.
47. 388 U.S. at 395. The decision in Prima Paint resulted in one concurrence and three impassioned
dissents. Id. at 407. In his dissent, Justice Black calls the majority's holding "fantastic"-in a bad
way. Id. Black's dissent centers on his criticism that the majority's holding constitutes judicial legis-
lation-Black reads the Federal Arbitration Act as emphasizing that "nonlawyers designated to adjust
and arbitrate factual controversies arising out of valid contracts would not trespass upon the courts'
prerogative to decide the legal question of whether any legal contract exists upon which to base an
arbitration." Id. at 408.
48. Id. at 398.
49. Id. at 395.
50. Id.
51. See Id. The focus on these sections is to the exclusion of § 2, as Black's dissent notes. Id. at
412.
52. Id. at 402 (citation omitted).
2005]
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in issue.",53 In other words, if there is no issue with the validity of the arbitration
agreement itself, the federal court has no jurisdiction to hear the case.54 But the
federal court does have jurisdiction to hear claims concerning fraud in the in-
ducement of the arbitration clause, because that is an issue that "goes to the 'mak-
ing' of the agreement to arbitrate ....
The idea of sep, arability espoused by Prima Paint reversed the practice of the
majority of courts. Since Prima Paint, courts have completely turned around-
some even have "extended separability beyond the fraud context to include other
• ,,57
defenses to contract formation .... The notion of separability that comes from
Prima Paint was joined by the principle of implied consent.5 8 In other words, by
agreeing to a contract's terms, a party therefore has impliedly agreed to the arbi-
tration provision, which is separably enforceable from the rest of the contract
without regard to the enforceability of the rest of the contract.
5 9
Twenty-eight years later, without once citing Prima Paint, the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously decided First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan in 1995. 6 0
The case centered on disputes regarding debt between First Options of Chicago,
Inc., "a firm that clears stock trades," 61 and Manuel and Carol Kaplan and MK
Investments, Inc (MKI). 62 The parties entered agreements to take care of the Kap-
lans' and MKI's debts to First Options.63 After First Options' demands for pay-
ment of debt were unsuccessful, it attempted to take the Kaplans to arbitration, but
they refused because only one agreement out of four actually contained the arbi-
tration clause, and that agreement was signed by MK Investments but not by the
Kaplans.64
The Court stated that the answer about who has the power to decide arbitrabil-
ity differs from the answer to whether the dispute should be arbitrated when the
agreement itself is ambiguous: there is a presumption in favor of arbitration if the
question is whether the dispute is arbitrable, but no presumption when the ques-
tion is who should decide arbitrability. The Court reasoned that this distinction
was "understandable" because in the whether question, "the parties likely gave at
least some thought to the scope of arbitration," moreover, the FAA's policy to-
ward arbitration is "permissive." 66 On the other hand, the answer to who decides
has the opposite presumption because a "party often might not focus upon that
53. Id. at 403-04 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004)).
54. Id. at 404.
55. Id. at 403-04 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).
56. Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability:
Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. Rev. 819, 840
(2003).
57. Id. at 849. See also Gregory v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., No. 98-1840, 1999 WL 674765,
at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1999).
58. Reuben, supra note 56 at 849-50.
59. Id.
60. First Options, 514 U.S. 938, 938 (1995).
61. Id. at 940.
62. Id. MK Investments, Inc. was an investment company owned by Manuel Kaplan. Id. First
Options had cleared its trading account. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 944-45.
66. Id. at 945.
[Vol. 2
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question or upon the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their
own powers.' '67 The issue before the First Options court was who had the power
(the arbitrator or the court) to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitration. 68
The Court held that the answer depended on whether the parties agreed to allow
an arbitrator decide whether the dispute was arbitrable. 69 But, the Court added,
courts cannot just assume that the parties made such an agreement-there must be
"'clear and unmistakabl[e]' evidence" that they made that agreement.70 The rea-
son for this is that arbitration "is simply a matter of contract between the par-
ties.",7' A dispute should never be sent to arbitration unless the parties "have




A few years after First Options, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.73 The case arose from a dispute between an invest-
ment firm, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., and its client, Karen Howsam. Howsam
invested in four partnerships at the advice of Dean Witter, but later sought arbitra-
tion pursuant to their Client Service Agreement on the basis that Dean Witter had
"misrepresented the virtues of the partnerships. 74 Howsam had sought arbitration
before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) whose "Code of
Arbitration Procedure" required that the dispute could not be more than six years
old.75 Dean Witter brought suit in order to s uash the arbitration proceeding be-
cause the dispute was more than six years old. 6
The Court held that the question presented was not within the "pro-court pre-
sumption" created by First Options, but instead, was a procedural (not substan-
tive) dispute, which an arbitrator would decide.77 This is the rubric of substantive
v. procedural disputes-which Howsam explains still exists, even after First Op-
tions. Indeed, the Court explains that First Options did not change that answer;
instead, the issue in First Options about arbitrability was entirely different and the
lower courts had begun to obfuscate the meaning of the word "arbitrability." 78 At
issue in Howsam was a procedural question (timeliness of the motion to compel
arbitration), not the "narrow" question of arbitrability governed by First Op-
tions.7 9 First Options gives a pro-court presumption when there is a question
about whether an arbitrator can decide that the dispute ought to be arbitrated 80 (the
arbitrability of arbitrability).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 942.
69. Id. at 943.
70. Id. at 944. See also AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986).
71. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
72. Id.
73. Howsam, 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
74. Id. at 81-82.
75. Id. at 82.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 84 (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964)); see dis-
cussion infra pp. 9-10.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 83.
80. Id. at 83-84.
20051
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Since the decisions of First Options and Howsam, courts have applied various
approaches on their meaning.8 1 Some courts have cited to First Options but ap-
plied Prima Paint without noting any possible tension between the cases.82 Some
courts have noted the tension between the cases but rejected any possibility that
First Options revised Prima Paint.83 "More commonly," courts ignore any ten-
sion created by First Options and simply apply Prima Paint.84 The courts are in
disarray as to the meaning of First Options.
There are a few examples of courts facing the issue of what First Options
means in relation to Prima Paint's separability doctrine. In Gregory v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the two cases
conflict, and subsequently held First Options operative. The Court related:
Mrs. Gregory's complaint highlights the tension between two competing
lines of authority under the FAA. On the one hand, the Supreme Court
has held that arbitration provisions should be broadly construed so that
arbitrators may decide all issues encompassed by an arbitration provi-
sion. This doctrine has been extended to allow arbitrators to decide issues
of fraud in the inducement, mutual mistake, unconscionability, and con-
fusion-issues that go to the enforceability of the contract as a whole. See
infra section II(B).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court is cognizant of the fact that arbi-
tration may only be compelled where the parties have agreed to arbitrate.
The Supreme Court has held that as a general rule the court, and not the
arbitrator, must decide whether the parties have agreed that an issue is or
is not subject to arbitration. See infra section II(C).
We hold that the latter line of authority must prevail in this case. The first
principle of arbitration law is that a party cannot be compelled to arbi-
trate a dispute unless that party has agreed to arbitration.85
The first of the three paragraphs above outlines the rule from Prima Paint and
the second paragraph summarizes First Options. So while noting the tension, the
court does not do much more with it other than decide its case in accordance with
First Options.
86
The result in an Alabama Supreme Court case also reinforces the ruling in
First Options and addresses the tension with Prima Paint precedent.87 The court
stated that at issue was a general claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract,
not a specific claim as to fraud with regard to the arbitration provision-which
81. See Reuben, supra note 56, at 876-78.
82. Reuben, supra note 56, at 878. See Id. at n.348 for several cases that support this finding.
83. Id. (citing Wright v. SFX Entm't Inc., No. 00 CIV 5354 SAS, 2001 WL 103433, at *4 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2001).
84. Id. (citing Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2002); Sleeper
Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002)).
85. No. 98-1840, 1999 WL 674765, at *3-4 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1999).
86. Id.
87. Exparte Perry, 744 So. 2d 859 (Ala. 1999).
[Vol. 2
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means the doctrine of separability applies. 88 The court's decision is strange: while
it says that First Options does not apply because of the separability it decides the
issue of fraud anyway-and finds the fraud claim lacking merit. 89 This result is
exactly what the application of First Options would require.
90
A recent example of a court struggling with the Prima Paint separability doc-
trine is the Florida Supreme Court in Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
91
The result the court reached is in accordance with First Options, but the court
appears not to rely on it and instead distinguishes Prima Paint from the facts be-
fore it.92 The distinction made was that Prima Paint dealt with a voidable claim
of fraud in the inducement, while Cardegna had a possibly void contract on its
hands due to violation of state usury laws. 9 3 The court reasoned, "if the underly-
ing contract is held entirely void as a matter of law, all of its provisions, including
the arbitration clause, would be nullified as well."94 This distinction from Prima
Paint leaves the court to deal with the issue as First Options would have had it-
by making the court decide the issues.
In Fox v. Tanner, the court directly confronted the tension between First Op-
tions and Prima Paint. The court's reasoning for deciding the issue in accordance
with First Options is explored below.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Wyoming Supreme Court heard Fox v. Tanner on appeal from a Wyo-
95ming district court's denial of a motion compelling arbitration. The issues on
appeal were 1) whether the appeal should be dismissed because defendants failed
to comply with state requirements and procedure in applying for a petition for writ
of review and 2) whether the court should compel arbitration. 96 The Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to deny defendant's motion
to compel arbitration.
97
The court perfunctorily replied to plaintiff's argument that the appeal was not
performed correctly before getting to the substantive issues of the case. The court
noted that it initially denied plaintiffs' attempt to dismiss the appeal, but did so
without prejudice, which allowed plaintiffs to argue again that defendants' appeal
lacked conformity with state appellate procedure, making their decision on this
matter a part of the final opinion.98 Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the District
Court's decision on arbitration was not a final appealable order.99 What the de-
fendants should have done, plaintiffs argued, was to apply for a petition for writ of
88. Id. at 868.
89. Id.
90. Reuben, supra note 56, at 876.
91. 849 So.2d 860 (Fla. Jan. 20, 2005).
92. Id. at 863-65.
93. Id. at 863.
94. Id.
95. 101 P.3d 939, 940 (Wyo. 2004).
96. Id. at 942, 943-50.
97. Id. at 950.
98. Id. at 942.
99. Id. (citing W.R.A.P. 1.05).
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review since the District Court's decision was only an interlocutory order.1 t° The
court struck down plaintiffs' argument by showing that under Wyoming statutes
and Jackson State Bank v. Homar, an order denying a motion to compel arbitra-
tion could form the basis of an immediate appeal.' 0'
The court then grappled with the question of whether the court should allow
the dispute to be sent to arbitration. The defendants urged that the doctrine of
separability espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court in Prima Paint was applicable-
"a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract, as contrasted with a
claim of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration agreement itself' ought to be
submitted to the arbitrator. °2 In addition, court precedent since Prima Paint,
including Spahr v. Secco, a 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decision, has reaffirmed
the separability doctrine. 10 3 The plaintiffs, looking to litigate their claims, argued
that the separability doctrine had been modified since Prima Paint-therefore,
any theory of implied consent would not be enough to waive their day in court.'
4
Instead, the defendants had to show the plaintiffs manifested clear and unmistak-
able consent to arbitrate.
10 5
Looking to First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, the court found that ordinar-
ily, a court ought to apply state contract law to decide whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate an issue.' Stated another way, "generally applicable contract de-
fenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)]."' 0 7 What the FAA would not allow, the court stated, is application of
state law intended to single out arbitration agreements for different, prejudicial
treatment. °8 The effect intended by the enactment of the FAA was to remove
arbitration agreements from their historically "suspect status" and put them on the
"same footing" as other agreements. 19
The court made a distinction between two kinds of questions about whether
the dispute is supposed to be arbitrated when there is "silence or ambiguity" on
the question."0 ) First, "who" decides (either the arbitrator or the judge of a court)
whether the dispute should be arbitrated."' Second, "whether" the dispute can be
arbitrated-"whether" the dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment.' 2 The answer to the second question-"whether" the dispute ought to be
100. Id. An interlocutory order requires an application for a petition for writ of review under
W.R.A.P. 13. Id.
101. Id. The Wyoming statute is part of the Wyoming Uniform Arbitration Act and states that "[aln
appeal may be taken from: (i) An order denying the application to compel arbitration ...." Id. See
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-36-119 (2003). In Jackson State Bank v. Homar, the Wyoming Supreme Court
allowed a direct appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Id.; Homar, 837 P.2d 1081
(Wyo. 1992).
102. Id. at 943; Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 2003).
103. Fox, 101 P.3d at 943.
104. Id. at 943-44.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 944; First Options, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).
107. Fox, 101P.3d at 944.
108. Id.; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483,493 n.9 (1987).
109. Fox, 101 P.3d at 944 (citation omitted).
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arbitrated-is answered in light of the presumption in favor of arbitration."13 The
court reasons that the answer to this question makes sense because the parties
have contemplated that at least some issues would go to arbitration." 1
4
The first question of "who" decides is more complex. Contrary to the reason-
ing the court used above--where it stated that the parties have likely contemplated
the scope of arbitration--the parties "often might not focus upon" the question of
"who" decides whether a dispute should be arbitrated. 1 5 Furthermore, giving
arbitrators the ability to decide whether the dispute belongs in arbitration bears a
weighty risk: "for doing so might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a





The Fox court noted that this result is in accordance with the policy of keep-
ing arbitration a matter of contract." 1 7 While ordinarily the question of "arbitrabil-
ity" is construed in favor of compelling arbitration, the question of "who" decides
is the exception to the rule." That question has the presumption of going to the
judge, unless the parties clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate that issue. 19
The Fox court relied on Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. in its charac-
terization of the question of "who" decides arbitrability-which Howsam refers to
as a "gateway dispute."' 20 A gateway dispute is a
narrow circumstance where contracting parties would likely have ex-
pected a court to have decided the gateway matter, where they are not
likely to have thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so,
and, consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court
avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well
not have agreed to arbitrate.'21
On the other hand, Howsam noted that a dispute about arbitration which cen-
ters on "procedural" questions are presumptively handled by an arbitrator.
22
These procedural questions include: "time limits, notice, laches, [and] estop-
pel."'
123
The Fox court finds defendants' reliance on Spahr v. Secco as an example of
a restatement of Prima Paint to be misplaced. 24 Instead, Spahr emphasizes the
113. Id.; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
114. Fox, 101 P.3d at 945.
115. Id.
116. id. But cf. Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1508-
09(1959).
117. Fox, 101 P.3d at 945; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-85 (2002).
118. Fox, 101 P.3d at 946; Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83-85.
119. Id..
120. Fox, 101 P.3d at 945; Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
121. Fox, 101 P.3d at 945; Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83-84.
122. Fox, 101 P.3d at 946; Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
123. Fox, 101 P.3d at 946; Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84-85.
124. Fox, 101 P.3d at 947. See also Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003). Spahr arose out
of claims filed in state court including "breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive trust, and negli-
gence" against a stockbroker and her firm. Spahr, 330 F. 3d at 1267. After defendants removed the
case to federal district court, the defendants sought to compel arbitration found under the Cash Ac-
count Agreement but such order was denied. Id. at 1268. At issue in Spahr is whether plaintiffs
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findings of First Options.'25 Spahr held that a broad provision of arbitration does
not furnish the "requisite clear and unmistakable consent" needed to compel the
parties to arbitrate the dispute.' 2 6 Since the dispute established by the plaintiffs
contest the validity of the arbitration provision-and therefore is not a general
attack against the contract, in fact, the plaintiffs rely on the contract in part-the
dispute constitutes a gateway dispute that the court should resolve.
1 27
The court rejected the defendants' argument that there was no proof that the
plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to agree to the arbitration provision.22 The
defendants stated that if plaintiffs were not fraudulently induced into arbitration,
then the claim of fraud should be determined by an arbitrator pursuant to the
Prima Paint separability doctrine.' 29 The Fox court remained unpersuaded since
the District Court never reached a determination that there was fraud in the in-
ducement of the arbitration provision.' Even if the District Court had deter-
mined that to be the case, the court found that the District Court was correct not to




The Fox v. Tanner court properly rejects separability in its interpretation of
First Options. This comment will argue that the decision was correct for three
basic reasons. First, separability and Prima Paint represent a derogation of con-
tract law. Second, rejection of separability is consistent with the policy of the
FAA. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the view handles the momentous
waiver of access to courts in an appropriate manner.
Before reaching those points, it is helpful to the discussion to look to schol-
arly analysis of the issues to crystallize the points argued in this comment. As
discussed earlier, courts have dealt with the implications of First Options in a
variety of ways.' 32 Scholars have not reached a consensus on the issue, either.
Professor of Law, Richard C. Reuben has argued that First Options and Howsam
have created tension against Prima Paint's separability doctrine, so much as to
seriously doubt the vitality of Prima Paint's rulings,' 33 a position this comment
reinforces for the three reasons stated above. On the other end of the spectrum,
the notion that First Options has undermined separability "escapes" other schol-
ars, including Alan Scott Rau, who believes First Options is no more than a re-
alleged mental deficiency (dementia and Alzheimer's disease) invalidates "both the entire contract and
the specific agreement to arbitrate in the contract." Id. at 1273 (emphasis in original). The court held
that it did. Id.
125. Fox, 101 P.3d at 947.
126. Id. at 949; Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1271.
127. Fox, 101 P.3d at 949.




132. See discussion infra pp. 9-12 and accompanying notes, 73-94.
133. Reuben, infra note 56, at 883.
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statement of the law. 134 Rau's position is inventive, but counter-intuitive to any
basic reading of First Options.
Reuben writes that First Options rejected the idea that implied consent could
be used to enforce an arbitration agreement against parties---ostensibly the rule
from Prima Paint.'35 Instead, First Options requires more--clear and unmistak-
able consent. 36 Reuben treats First Options and Howsam as evidence of a new
trend in the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the question about who decides
whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate, in juxtaposition to the old view es-
poused in Prima Paint.
137
The view of the First Options court ought to prevail, according to Reuben,
because if a court is "troubled by" concerns regarding the validity of the container
contracts, "it borders on the absurd to suggest" that a court should "endorse a rule
compelling into arbitration a party to a legally unenforceable contract merely be-
cause of the presence of an arbitration provision in the otherwise unenforceable
contract."' 38 Indeed, the finding that this suggestion is "absurd" is related to our
surprise based on the fundamental tenets of contract law, as discussed below.
On the other end of the spectrum, Alan Scott Rau believes that this interpreta-
tion of First Options results from a misunderstanding of Prima Paint.139 Rau
rejects the reading of Prima Paint as having imputed the theory of implied con-
sentn°---instead, Prima Paint requires an "agreement" to arbitration, like any
other contract provision.' 4 ' Therefore, the notion that First Options required
"clear and unmistakable consent" to arbitration is no different than a "sensible
reading"'' 42 of Prima Paint.143 In fact, Rau suggests that interpreting First Options
to say something more is required for enforcement of an arbitration provision
"convey[s] that there is something indefinably suspect about the entire notion of
arbitration."' 44
Rau provides several illustrations to bolster the doctrine of separability to
counter the idea that "defects in the main agreement must [or must not] vitiate the
arbitration clause."' 145 In Prima Paint, Prima Paint resisted arbitration on the
grounds that Flood & Conklin had fraudulently misrepresented material facts,
including the solvency of the business Prima Paint bought. 146 As we know, the
court held that the general claim of fraud did not extend to the validity of the arbi-
134. Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About "Separability" in Seventeen Simple
Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1,98 (2003).
135. Reuben, supra note 56, at 873.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 883.
138. Id. at 876.
139. Rau, supra note 134, at 15, 98-100.
140. Id. at 4-5.
141. Id. at 4, 8.
142. Id. at 4, 95.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 13. This attack implies that the opposite view does not put arbitration provisions on the
same footing as other contractual agreements-a dispute resolution gaffe-since it conflicts with the
policy of the FAA to counter judicial hostility to arbitration agreements. Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a
Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 140
(2002).
145. Rau, supra note 134, at 18-25, 27.
146. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967).
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tration provision.147 Rau asserts, "Is it not perfectly plausible under these circum-
stances [in Prima Paint] that they might have chosen to submit to arbitration-not
only questions with respect to the quality of F&C's performance-but also ques-
tions with respect to whether F&C had misrepresented the quality of its perform-
ance?"'14 8 Rau rejects the conclusion that "'a claimed lack of contract formation
by definition includes a claim that the resisting party also did not agree to the
arbitration clause."
' 49
Rau's conclusion is flawed. Although he suggests that anti-separability sen-
timent is anti-arbitration because it fails to put arbitration on equal footing with
other contract provisions,1 50 his view has the same problem: the result of enforcing
separability is to put arbitration on a pedestal, not equal footing. Consider the
following: if a party in a similar situation to Prima Paint sues for fraudulent mis-
representation, seeking to revoke the contract, material provisions of the contract
are voided. This means Prima Paint does not have to pay the purchase price un-
der, say, Article I; Flood & Conklin does not have to effectuate the transfer of its
assets under Article II; Article III requiring Prima Paint to pay property tax is
without effect; and so on. If there is an arbitration provision under Article
XXVIII, it may be the only one enforced in the subsequently voided contract un-
der Rau's interpretation. Reuben and the court in Fox v. Tanner rightly find no
sense in that result.
The result in Fox was the correct one since it is in accordance with contract
law. Under the law of contracts, fraud voids a contract completely and automati-
cally; no provision under the contract is enforceable due to the fraud. 15 1 However,
Prima Paint intruded onto this principle of contracts when it held that an arbitra-
tion clause was separable from the rest of the contract, allowing an arbitrator to
decide the existence of the contract. Professor Stephen J. Ware believes that the
doctrine of separability requires us to merely speculate that the parties consented
to arbitration: "Had a contract consisting of just the arbitration clause been pre-
sented to the parties, they might have given their voluntary consent to it. But, that
is just speculation."'' 52 Furthermore, to "impos[e] duties" based on that specula-
tion "has no place in contract law."'1
53
The result in Prima Paint seems to say that the policy of the FAA is blind en-
forcement of arbitration at all times-even when there might not be an agreement
to arbitrate. Prima Paint's decision focused on §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA to the ex-
clusion of § 2 and the rest of the FAA. 54 This was a fatal flaw in the reasoning of
the court and resulted in a perversion of the FAA's policy, since § 2 does make an
exception for enforcement of arbitration when "law or equity" would result in
147. Id. at 403-04.
148. Rau, supra note 134, at 18.
149. Id. at 27; Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL L. REV. 1377, 1459
(1991).
150. Rau, supra note 134, at 13.
151. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG & CAROL SANGER, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 324 (6th ed. 2001).
152. Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 131
(1996).
153. Id.
154. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,403-04 (1967).
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"revocation of [the] contract."' 55 Prima Paint read into § 4 that the "making" of
the arbitration agreement was not reviewable by courts.' 56 However, "[n]othing
would have prevented the court in Prima Paint from holding that the making of an
arbitration clause is in issue whenever the making of the agreement containing it
is in issue."' 157 The logical result, and the result taught reached by contract law, is
that if the entire agreement is in issue, the arbitration clause is also at issue.
58
Indeed, the result of the Prima Paint rule-a presumptive validity of arbitra-
tion clauses at all times-may result in denying unsuspecting people their rights to
their day in court. An agreement to arbitration waives the ability of the parties to
access a court for settling their disputes. Reuben writes, "Trust in the courts is
one of the most precious elements of the social capital of our legal system. Con-
tinuing to sacrifice that capital on separability's altar of judicial efficiency is a
high price to pay for a doctrine with little other credible justification.' 59 Access
to the courts for the indigent is protected under the Equal Protection Clause as a
155. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Section 2 of the FAA is as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Id.
156. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). Section 4 of the FAA
states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days' notice in writing of
such application shall be served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be made in the
manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall hear the parties, and
upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbi-
tration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under such
agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration
is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the
same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be de-
manded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is within admiralty juris-
diction, the court shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party al-
leged to be in default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the notice
of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make an
order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or may specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury find that no agreement in writ-
ing for arbitration was made or that there is no default in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding
shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that
there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the
parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).
157. Reuben, supra note 56, at 843. See IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL., 2 FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §
15.2 n.13 (1994).
158. Instead, and perhaps due to the increasing favoritism of disposing cases via arbitration, arbitra-
tion clauses in a boilerplate contract is "no longer surprising, unexpected or perhaps even 'material"'
and therefore do not render a contract or the arbitration clause unconscionable. JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.
& HARRY M. FLECHTNER, SALES, LEASES AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 177 (2d ed. 2003).
159. Reuben, supra note 56, at 848.
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fundamental right, and, accordingly, is given strict scrutiny to any infringement of
it-the highest scrutiny afforded to citizens' rights.16° But more generally, our
society holds the view that there is a "right to sue": "[t]he most relevant concep-
tion of fairness is the idea that individuals who have suffered injuries for which
the law provides a remedy should be permitted to sue to recover for their losses.
That is, it would be unfair to bar a potential plaintiff with a valid claim from
bringing a lawsuit. ' 6 1 Without embarking on the discussion of "frivolous law-
suits," the idea is that our society, and of course, our legal system, holds the right
to be heard in court in high regard. Therefore, a putative agreement to waive that
right is not to be trifled with. Separability flies in the face of what we know about
contracts and "right to sue" at the cost of appearing trigger-happy for arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION
First Options left courts with the question of whether separability was valid.
The answer to that question in the Fox court's interpretation of First Options is
that separability is no longer valid, nor should it be. Instead of treating an arbitra-
tion clause differently from any other provision in a contract, as would occur as
the result of applying Prima Paint, the Fox court's interpretation of First Options
does what should never have been novel-applying contract law to contracts by
requiring clear and unmistakable consent to arbitration. Here, First Options pre-
serves the right of parties to their day in court, a fundamental right. Finally, this
reading of First Options applies a more sensible interpretation of the FAA to arbi-
tration. Courts struggling with the meaning of First Options could learn some-
thing from the Fox court. The only problem with Fox v. Tanner, then, is that it is
not a binding U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the issue.
MICHELLE ST. GERMAIN
160. See WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS,
COURT ACCESS, WELFARE, AND THE POOR 1039-80 (11 th ed. 2001).
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